

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: EXECUTING WAR WITHOUT UNITY OF  
COMMAND**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The nature of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has led the United States to execute war with all elements of the national security apparatus. Because the United States Government (USG) fights this war with the interagency, it has maintained a strategic leadership framework conducive to unified action. Unity of effort, a military principle normally held for operations other than war, has become the lead concept for exercising national power against today's threat. Unfortunately history has proven that this concept does not work in time of war; inherent prejudices and jurisdictional safeguarding within large institutions such as the USG hinder and sometimes fail to achieve national objectives. This project examines the characteristics of the GWOT, how the USG is currently organized to fight it, why it cannot succeed without change, and what additional measures are needed to correct the situation. The research reveals unity of effort without unity of command cannot achieve the decisive action required in war nor the efficiency and effectiveness demanded by the American people. Recommendations are made to establish an executor of the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism, an individual that can be held accountable for the execution of the GWOT.



## GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: EXECUTING WAR WITHOUT UNITY OF COMMAND

On 11 September 2001, the United States was attacked by al-Qaeda, a non-state extremist organization whose primary method of warfare - terrorism, changed the way in which America would fight its first 21<sup>st</sup> century war. Al-Qaeda, and the like-minded organizations that have energized for global jihad, are neither superior in numbers nor technology; however, they have been able to survive using tactics, techniques, and procedures the United States was initially unprepared to counter effectively or efficiently. What was once a small group of Sunni-Salafist extremists has now metamorphosed into a transnational movement of like-minded groups, networked and capable of striking anywhere in the world. America's initial response to the attack was a traditional one; military power striking at what was thought to be the center of gravity for al-Qaeda: Afghanistan. However, unable to defeat al-Qaeda decisively, the United States realized that it would take more than the power of the military to neutralize the capabilities of the current threat.

Today's threat is complex and driven by ideological differences not only with the western world but also with the moderate Muslim society. It is well-financed, has its own system of financial networking, and can attain support from other non-state and state actors alike. Communications are easily conducted through the use of the internet, satellite technology, and couriers. Recruiting is made easy because of underlying grievances at the local, regional, and global level; the perceived societal injustices are enough to push disgruntled individuals to joining the jihad. Corruption and ineffective political, social, and economic systems fuel the fire of grievance. The threat also lives within western societies, taking advantage of civil liberties within sovereign nations in order to sustain itself and pursue activities supportive of its cause. It is obvious that the United States Armed Forces do not have the span of authority, expertise, or ability to affect the majority of these factors that feed the global jihad. The character of this threat is unique, and so a paradigm shift must occur in which all elements of national power are synchronized to conduct non-kinetic and kinetic warfare at a level of intensity not seen in past wars. The United States must adapt to this fight by organizing itself for this war in a way that allows it to focus all elements of national power against this threat efficiently and effectively.

On 22 July 2004, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission) published its recommendation for "Unity of effort across the foreign-domestic divide,"<sup>1</sup> in order to conduct joint action against al-Qaeda. Recommending bold changes to what it deemed national security institutions "rooted in a different era,"<sup>2</sup> the commission wanted to drive the United States Government (USG) into a new way of thinking.

They advocated a wholesale change in which the Cold War framework of the USG developed and refined to contain the spread of communism by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, becomes a “quick, imaginative, and agile”<sup>3</sup> structure that could respond to the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The key message sent to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government was that America had the resources and people to win the war, but it did not have a structure to promote unity of effort against the existing threats. Five major recommendations were offered: a) unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamic terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center; b) unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director; c) unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries; d) unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and e) strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.

The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) was formally established in December 2004, after the 9-11 Commission suggested a “center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence.”<sup>4</sup> The significance of the NCTC was embedded in the fact that the commission had uncovered a disorganized system of national operational and intelligence information-sharing that had contributed to the surprise attack of 11 September 2001. The NCTC is a multi-agency center under the Director for National Intelligence (DNI); the DNI is the President’s chief national intelligence adviser and coordinator with oversight of 16 intelligence components. NCTC’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) is “responsible for developing, implementing, and assessing the effectiveness of national plans that coordinate and apply all instruments of national power.”<sup>5</sup> DSOP ensures the activities and capabilities of USG departments and agencies are integrated and synchronized in an orchestrated government-wide counterterrorism campaign.<sup>6</sup> NCTC’s main effort has been the development and implementation of the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism (NIP-WOT). Although NCTC and DSOP are charged with developing and implementing the NIP-WOT, they are considered nothing more than facilitators; in other words they are not empowered to direct any action from other departments or agencies that comprise the USG when implementing the national plan.<sup>7</sup> A serious shortfall, it denies strategic leadership to a critical phase of the War on Terrorism.

The USG’s strategic leadership framework seeks to use unity of effort to combat al-Qaeda; this is reinforced by the NIP-WOT. The NIP-WOT delineates the means and ways for executing the strategic objectives (ends) for the GWOT. This document outlines the tasks to be

completed and delineates the lead agency for executing such tasks. Supported and supporting relationships for all elements of national power are outlined for each objective. In theory, with the tasks delineated and the lead agency identified with which to complete them, the concept of unity of effort to accomplish the tasks is technically complete. Unfortunately, the NIP-WOT neither provides command authority nor grants power to compel unity of action. Consequently, the current USG framework, for effectively implementing the NIP-WOT, does not facilitate a clear chain of command for conducting kinetic and non-kinetic warfare in a synergistic manner, and lacks the accountability required to secure decisive victory. The question of who leads the USG effort for the GWOT on a daily basis is not easily answered primarily because the organizational structure of our national security apparatus is based on bureaucratic power sharing rather than on decisive decision-making and command authority.

This paper argues that in time of war, unity of effort without unity of command will result in ineffectiveness on the battlefield. In this case the battlefield is the global environment in which the GWOT is being fought; one which deals with sovereignty issues, underlying economic, social and political issues that cultivate extremist behavior, and battle-space that involves non-kinetic and kinetic means for dealing with the threat. It draws attention to the fact that unity of command is a military principle of war that cannot be discarded because the primary means have changed for engaging the threat: the interagency vice the military. To succeed, the USG must not only encourage unity of effort but it must also create a credible executive position with legitimate powers and authority to implement the NIP-WOT. What the USG has failed to do is to provide an “implementer” of its national plan. To make this argument, the paper discusses historical precedence where unity of effort has failed, particularly for large bureaucratic organizations attempting to execute civil as well as military operations. It postulates that in order for decisive action to occur in an efficient and effective manner, unity of command is required to overcome bureaucratic jurisdictional hurdles and parochial safeguarding. It also suggests that unity of command alone will not result in success; the importance of appropriate authorities and power to achieve national objectives cannot be overemphasized.

### Unity of Effort

What then is unity of effort and why is it important? Simply put, unity of effort is an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives.<sup>8</sup> At the national level in support of the GWOT, it is the ability of the entire interagency to institutionalize the strategy reflected in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006 (NSCT) and develop an atmosphere focused on collaboration and unified purpose. More importantly, it is the ability of key interagency

organizations to discard the organizational characteristics of jurisdictional safeguarding and stove-piping information, in favor of a team effort for achieving the national tasking outlined in the NIP-WOT. The military has long understood the meaning of unity of effort and has written about it as “a vital link between the military and the economic, diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as non-governmental and international organizations.”<sup>9</sup>

Understanding that operations other than war can pose scenarios that are not conducive to its war principle, unity of command, military commanders are schooled on the virtues of cooperating with civilian authorities and organizations in order to accomplish the mission. Unity of effort then is a process in which different organizational powers and authorities come together for unified action in order to produce a synergistic effect against a given objective, without any one individual or organization being in complete charge of the ways and means. The concept works for military operations other than war, but does it work for war, and specifically the GWOT, when decisive action and decision-making is necessary to accomplish directed tasks in what is often a time constricted operational environment?

Unity of effort is focused on process not product. This may be acceptable in the planning phase of kinetic and non-kinetic operations, but once the implementation phase is executed does this type of structure produce efficient and effective results? In military operations conducted during war, process is secondary to product; the product in this case is accomplishing the objective and the sound decisionmaking that accompanies it. In military operations, decisionmaking becomes of the utmost importance to overcome the urgency of crisis. However, the USG has proven time and again that its ability to make decisions is “too often entangled in knots of conflict, clearance, coordination, and delay.”<sup>10</sup> The RAND Corporation recently conducted research on the topic of government structure and found the “fundamental reorganization of the federal government is urgently needed to improve its capacity for coherent design and efficient implementation of public policy.”<sup>11</sup> According to RAND there is extensive redundancy and crossover between government functions leading to a weakening of effective government performance. The consequence of such actions is the waste of limited resources, inability to accomplish national goals, impediments to effective management, and dangers posed to our national security.<sup>12</sup> If the USG is to succeed, can it afford to have impeded decisionmaking during GWOT implementation? The 9-11 Commission believed the USG had adept people in its organization and the resources to execute any task given to them; what it did not have was a responsive structure for decisionmaking and implementation. The commission’s overarching message was that the USG must structure itself



for unified action if it is to defeat the global menace that precipitated the events of 11 September 2001.

The 9-11 commission identified weakness in leadership, particularly accountability and responsibility for the management of information and intelligence on the threat. The commission regularly asked witnesses, “Who is the quarterback?”<sup>13</sup> thus referring to the inter-agency intelligence organizations tracking threats. The commission understood other players were in positions doing their jobs, but they questioned repeatedly, “who is calling the play that assigns roles to help them execute as a team?”<sup>14</sup> Obviously concerned with the handling of threat cases and the scattered distribution of roles and responsibility, the commission surmised that someone needed to be put “in charge to ensure a unified effort.”<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately when the commission formulated this recommendation it remained myopic in its view, regulating the concept of unity of command, or putting someone in charge, to the intelligence field only, disregarding the operational field for the same. Operationally, no mention of unity of command was made for the implementation phase, solidifying unity of effort as the concept for strategic leadership for the GWOT and the national security apparatus.

Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, noted political scientists, argue that when perspectives differ, so do measures of success.<sup>16</sup> Based on a case study of governmental bureaucracy during a civil engineering project in the 1970s, agencies seeking to achieve the same objective were afflicted with a daily routine that prevented clear understanding of ends, ways, means, and their affect on each other during the operation. This led program managers to “impose their preferred sequence of events on the others, their priorities for the next step,”<sup>17</sup> with no regard for the overall achievement of objectives or the impact of their actions on others. Understandably, because no one was charged with synchronizing their efforts and following through to completion of the project, ineffectiveness and inefficiency dominated. Pressman and Wildavsky list seven factors that afflicted the synergistic effect they sought in the study: a) direct incompatibility with other commitments; b) no direct incompatibility, but a preference for other programs; c) simultaneous commitments to other projects; d) dependence on others who lack a sense of urgency in the project; e) differences of opinion on leadership and proper organizational roles; f) legal and procedural differences; and g) agreement coupled with a lack of power. In essence, they found that individual organizations could agree with a “substantive ends of a proposal and still oppose (or merely fail to facilitate) the means for effectuating it.”<sup>18</sup> Can this be an anomaly or are all large, multi-dimensional organizations encumbered with the same challenges in trying to garner unity of purpose, effort, and ends? Is it possible that although the NCTC has developed the NIP-WOT that the departments and agencies executing

the tasking will prolong unity of effort due to one or more of the seven outlined detractors? Can this be avoided if the military principle of war, unity of command, is implemented to precipitate unity of effort?

### Unity of Command

A core tenet of strategic, operational, and tactical military war planning, execution, and success is unity of command. Unity of command “means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”<sup>19</sup> When a single person is put in charge, a vested interest is developed in seeing through planning, execution, and mission accomplishment, but more importantly it allows for decisive action and leadership. “Leadership is widely viewed as an influence process, dependent upon the relationship between leader and followers.”<sup>20</sup> Based on the individual, leadership takes the management process of efficient and effective use of resources to a higher level of achievement based on character traits that include vision, decisiveness, risk-taking, self-confidence, and morale to name a few.<sup>21</sup> Unity of command ensures unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.<sup>22</sup> Unity of effort – coordination through cooperation and common interests - is an essential complement to unity of command.<sup>23</sup>

The President of the United States, advised by the National Security Council (NSC), is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort.<sup>24</sup> Some will argue that the President of the United States provides unity of command for the GWOT. It would be naïve to believe with all the other international and domestic issues the United States deals with on a daily basis that the President can devote all his time to the GWOT. One could argue the President is not an implementer during war. The issue was highlighted during the development of the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986:

Except for the President, no one coordinated activities of the War and Navy Departments. During the nineteenth century, the president’s role as sole coordinator did not overburden him. In the twentieth century, domestic affairs increasingly demanded the president’s attention. The expanded scope and complexity of military activities further taxed the chief executive. His inability to coordinate army and navy activities was not understood until the Pearl Harbor disaster provided compelling evidence.<sup>25</sup>

If the developers of Goldwater-Nichols felt the burden of twentieth century domestic affairs taxed the attention of the President, they would surely agree the advent of the information age and globalization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century would not reduce the burden.

Currently, no one USG person, department, or agency has been directed by presidential directive or other document to lead the GWOT. The NIP-WOT, introduced in National Security

Presidential Directive-46, delineates lead and supporting roles for specific tasking but falls short of empowering those departments or agencies with any additional authorities. The balance of power between departments and agencies contributes to shortcomings in implementation. The Director of NCTC would logically be considered the lead for the GWOT since he reports to the President on matters of the NIP-WOT, however, lacking authority and a budget, he is nothing more than an adviser. Pragmatically, these leadership issues can cause one to believe that the GWOT lacks the focus and leadership it deserves for implementation. Similarly, the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack deliberated a similar issue over 60 years ago.

Unity of effort without unity of command was determined to be a critical issue in the military's readiness failure during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack concluded that "Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility."<sup>26</sup> Admiral Kimmel, commander of the Pacific fleet, and Lieutenant General Short, commander of U.S. Army forces on Hawaii, were relieved in its aftermath, not because of dereliction of duty, but because of errors in judgment.<sup>27</sup> At the crux of the issue were misunderstandings, lack of cooperation, and conflict; in sum "they failed to carry out their orders and to discharge their basic and ultimate responsibilities."<sup>28</sup> Unity of effort, or mutual cooperation, was expected but had failed because there was no unity of command.<sup>29</sup> No one was put clearly in charge to resolve the inevitable disputes that plagued the military departments defending jurisdictional boundaries. No one leader was placed in charge to resolve the divergent interpretation of information, to settle disputes of perceived jurisdiction infringements, and to ultimately decide organizational direction when disagreements arose. Unity of effort lacked unity of command, leading to one of the greatest failures in American history. To the Joint Committee it was evident that had

the responsible commanders conferred together in such a manner as to reach joint decisions consonant with their plans, the system of mutual cooperation would have proved adequate. It is clear, however, that this system presents unnecessary and inevitable opportunities for personal failures and shortcomings. "The ubiquitous tendency to 'let George do it,' to assume the other fellow will take care of the situation, is an inseparable part of command by mutual cooperation."<sup>30</sup>

The Committee's first recommendation was to take immediate action "to ensure that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts."<sup>31</sup> Unity of command is an essential element of organizational efficiency and effectiveness. But as Kori Schake and Bruce Berkowitz, fellows at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, argue in their paper, National

Security: A Better Approach, reform and a need to provide a clear chain of command for responsibility is not enough, the executive branch must empower the GWOT implementer with the authority and budget he or she needs in order to effectively achieve the national objectives.<sup>32</sup>

### Authorities

Leadership must be accompanied by authority; the military has learned this lesson through numerous operations. Before the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, during a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) when Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn were advocating a more joint military, one with empowered combatant commanders, Senator Nunn was documented saying:

In our three years of studying reorganization, no deficiency has been as clearly or painfully demonstrated as the weaknesses of the unified commanders. Every time we've failed or performed poorly – such as Vietnam, Mayaguez, Pueblo, Beirut, Grenada – it can be traced to the lack of unity of command.” He paused, then continued in a more determined tone: “Unity of command gets a lot of lip service here in the Pentagon. But it is woefully implemented, we will continue to be plagued by operational problems until we strengthen field commanders. We must give them the authority they need to meld units from all services into an effective fighting force.”<sup>33</sup>

At the strategic level there are two main ingredients that make a leadership position legitimate and determine if the individual will be effective or not: presidential authority and budgetary control. Presidential authority allows the GWOT implementer to unite the pillars of national power in a synergistic manner in order to achieve strategic goals. A cabinet level executive with specific authorities to execute the NIP-WOT, in this case the GWOT implementer, would be able to overcome the jurisdictional safeguarding characteristic of today's national security apparatus. Speaking on behalf of the President and controlling the funding associated with GWOT, the implementer would be empowered to complete the tasking of the NIP-WOT. Departments and agencies of the USG would have no choice but to acquiesce to the leadership of the GWOT implementer. Some will argue that this modus operandi is not necessary or fruitful; however, the USG has experienced an ineffective blueprint for leadership in the past when unity of command was established for the nation's drug war but the appointed leader was not empowered to synchronize the nation's agencies to effectively execute the campaign.

Since the Harrison Act of 1914, the United States has been fighting a war on drugs.<sup>34</sup> Today the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and its Director (Drug Czar), a cabinet-level officer housed within the Executive Office of the President, is the leader of America's fight against illicit narcotics. Although some success has been demonstrated in

recent years, the truth is the office has struggled with attaining any real traction in its work because of the lack of operational or budgetary authority. Schake and Berkowitz echo this by stating

...the current drug czar lacks authority: he cannot direct resources within departments and does not control budget. Without budget control, strategic direction won't work.<sup>35</sup>

What success ONDCP has achieved can be attributed to a couple of extraordinary personalities that have brought a voice of strong leadership to the position despite not having adequate authorities.<sup>36</sup> Overall however, the position has been plagued by ineffectiveness with what many believe is the inability of the Drug Czar to unify the action of the approximately 50 federal agencies that fight the counter narcotics war. Although the Drug Czar is tasked with developing strategy and evaluating its success, he is truly nothing more than a spokesman for the issue; the challenge has been how to produce unity of effort absent unity of command. The lack of unity of command in the United States counter-drug war community had not gone unnoticed, particularly by those military professionals that have some interest in the counter narcotics effort. During testimony to the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress in March of 1996, Rear Admiral Andrew A. Granuzo, Chief of Joint Interagency Task Force – East, an interdiction organization created by Presidential Decision Directive -14 (PDD-14), voiced his dismay with the situation when he stated that the central obstacle to waging a more effective drug war is the fact that “there is no one in charge.”<sup>37</sup> This premise was reiterated by former Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Paul Yost, former Drug Czar William Bennett, and former DEA Administrator Robert C. Bonner.<sup>38</sup> Some consider this a congressional failure with the National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988, because it neglected to empower the Drug Czar when they established the position.<sup>39</sup> What the Drug Czar has become is a “political symbol rather than a substantive tool.”<sup>40</sup> What America cannot afford to do is to make the same mistake with the GWOT; the parallel between the drug war and the terrorism war is undeniable. If America is to succeed in either of these endeavors it will need to establish a position that provides for unity of command and then empower that individual with the authorities necessary to effectively wage the war.

### Way Ahead

At the urging of the President, the Congress should publish a War on Terror Act to establish the National Security Director for the War on Terrorism (NSD-WOT). Within the scope of his duties, the NSD-WOT, or WOT Czar, would be charged with developing and implementing the operational aspects of the NIP-WOT. In coordination with the DNI he would:

- a) develop, request, and execute, based on congressional approval, an operational budgetary

fund, much like combatant commanders; and b) lead the interagency in execution and assessment of implementation of the NIP-WOT. The NSD-WOT would be appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. The WOT Czar would be a statutory member of the National Security Council and be afforded all of the benefits of such membership, to include staff integration into the Policy Coordination Committees (PCC), Deputies Committees (DC), and Principals Committee (PC). Operationally, the Current Support and Requirements Department and the DSOP within NCTC, would fall under the WOT Czar's authority with a coordination line remaining with the rest of the NCTC organization. The intent of this structure is to bring operational unity of command to the unified action that NCTC executes on a daily basis. The following diagram portrays the current command and coordination diagram for Department of Defense and the proposed diagram for NSD-WOT (figure 1).




Figure 1. NSD-WOT authority diagram for implementation of the NIP-WOT.

Henri Fayol, a classical management theorist and often referred to as “the father of modern operational management theory,”<sup>41</sup> outlined 14 principles of management, which apply to this discussion. He states, “authority and responsibility, unity of command, unity of direction,

subordination of individual interest to general interest, and scalar chain”<sup>42</sup> are a few of the essential elements to productive management. Fayol explained that managing personnel through effective principles was essential to organizational soundness and good working order.<sup>43</sup> Functionally, this paper attempts to make the argument that authority, the right to give orders, and the power to exact obedience is a key to success. The USG does not want to repeat the mistakes it made when establishing the Drug Czar. As Fayol points out, “wheresoever authority is exercised responsibility arises.”<sup>44</sup> Meaning, with empowerment, NSD-WOT will naturally become responsible for the actions of national security apparatus with reference to the GWOT, overcoming one of the key barriers of today’s vague chain of command and lack of accountability.

Fayol’s concept of unity of command, or the need for each employee to have one and only one boss, remains valid in this proposal. NSD-WOT will hold USG Department and Agency Secretaries/Chiefs accountable for the inefficiencies or ineffectiveness of its field executors with respect to GWOT operations. In other words, NSD-WOT is not concerned with process but that the objectives are being achieved. Unity of direction, what Fayol describes as “a single mind generates a single plan and all play their part in that plan,”<sup>45</sup> underlines the thesis of this paper. Similar to unity of effort, Fayol believed that unity of direction depended upon unified action, coordination of strength, and focusing of effort; however, he also believed that unity of direction required one leader.<sup>46</sup> This is where most resistance would occur in the interagency. Under this thought process, subordination of individual interest to general interest is the largest obstacle to overcome; jurisdictional safeguarding will no doubt dominate as organizations resist giving up authority or funding.

Finally, establishing and implementing a scalar chain or a formal chain of command, which runs from top to bottom of the organization like the military is accustomed to, could be difficult for a civilian government to absorb. Once again the checks and balances of our power sharing bureaucracy do not permit one authority to grow disproportionately to another. One must now ponder, is the nation prepared to relearn lessons, lessons outlined in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and sacrifice effectiveness and efficiency for the sake of protecting interagency jurisdictional power?

What the United States needs is an individual dedicated to the challenges of GWOT, empowered with operational authority from the President and fiscally resourced by the Congress to provide a legitimate form of leadership in implementation of the national plan. Dr. John R. Hook, a noted management professor and former Army officer, argues in his book, *Leading At The Top*, that a senior leader must have a sense of context for his organization’s

unique characteristics and current situation.<sup>47</sup> Of utmost importance to this paper are his first two premises: 1) the degree of environmental and organizational turbulence, and 2) the stage of organizational development. President Bush has settled some of the internal turbulence in government by publishing the NSS and NSCT, however, “warring factions, faulty structures, and dysfunctional cultures can play havoc with organizational effectiveness and thus demand skilled leadership.”<sup>48</sup> In other words, strategy alone is not enough to help an organization like the USG. The USG is structured to fight the cold war, where the military is the vanguard for armed conflict and the other elements of national power are used primarily as pre-conflict deterrence efforts. Synergistic interagency efforts to fight a kinetic and non-kinetic war are foreign to the establishment and institutional foundations of the USG. Furthermore, based on five years of planning and execution, the USG has achieved a level of organizational maturity Hook would consider ready for a “different type of leader.”<sup>49</sup> With the establishment of the NIP-WOT and the NCTC, has the USG reached a level of organizational functioning that demands a person characterized by Dr. Hook as capable of “making the trains run on time”?<sup>50</sup> This paper has argued that unity of effort is not effective without unity of command, especially when describing the execution of war. After five years of struggling with the USG’s plan for combating terrorism, the time has come for the executive and legislative branches of government to appoint a leader for the GWOT to make the elements of national power operate in unison.

### Conclusion

Can the United States successfully execute the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror through national unified action without unity of command? Said another way, can the USG achieve unity of effort, with all elements of the national security apparatus, bring a synergistic effect of destruction against al-Qaeda and the transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals that threaten the American homeland and its national interests abroad? It is postulated that Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, initiated global jihad by merely stating commander’s intent to other extremist organizations that see the western world as a threat to Islamic culture. Local Islamic extremist groups have absorbed bin Laden’s intent and now attempt to act as unified global partners in the cause. It appears President Bush is attempting the same strategy - by publishing sufficient national guidance, he believes his intent will be promulgated throughout the United States’ security apparatus, and unified action will take place. Unfortunately President Bush is dealing with a bureaucracy rather than a group of loose organizations led by a “common vision.”<sup>51</sup> A bureaucracy is fundamentally much more complex to lead. However, President Bush has reinforced unified action through the concept of unity of



effort; regrettably he has either dismissed the concept of unity of command for implementation, or believes he provides the necessary leadership to prosecute the war.

The United States is currently engaged in a war against a non-state actor using traditional elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic), and developing new elements (financing, intelligence, and law enforcement), to overwhelm and defeat its enemy. This conflict requires more than the one combative means of war,<sup>52</sup> as described by Clausewitz. To achieve our national objectives, it will require a fully integrated, interdependent, and interagency approach. The shift in our national operating framework is significant. The U.S. military, grounded in Clausewitzian theory, has always been the vanguard of foreign policy resolution when actors refused to cooperate with less coercive measures. However, the events of 11 September 2001 pushed the U.S. into a war it was not optimally configured for; a war that would challenge the traditional thinking of compelling “our enemy to do our will.”<sup>53</sup> Today’s war is not conducted with military power alone, and so the military Principles of War<sup>54</sup> that have long been studied and trusted are being challenged at the national level. Although the United States military knows many of these principles have been written in blood by those who have experienced the result of something less astute, the interagency fight of today’s GWOT has us challenging this doctrine in order to fight with unity of effort.

The 9-11 Commission recommended the USG “lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.”<sup>55</sup> However, as this paper advocates, the USG has fallen short of this achievement by not emplacing a leader in charge of implementing the NIP-WOT with commensurate authority. The result thus far has been ineffectiveness in achieving national objectives and making the Long War longer. Whether civil or military, organizations as large as the USG require officially sanctioned leadership to attain efficiency and effectiveness in the achievement of its goals. Otherwise one or more factors outlined by Pressman and Wildavsky will affect the synergy of the groups. The Pearl Harbor Commission was quoted as saying, “The whole story of discussions during 1941 with respect to unity of command is a picture of jealous adherence to departmental prerogatives and unwillingness to make concessions in the interest of both the Army and Navy.”<sup>56</sup> The 9-11 commission had individuals with military backgrounds and understood the concepts of unity of command and unity of effort much like the Pearl Harbor Commission. Why then did one commission assess unity of command being essential and the other did not? Unfortunately, the 9-11 Commission needed to not only ask who the quarterback was, but who was the coach? Who was ensuring the players made practice, the right players were on the field, and the game strategy was executed?

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon on the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Final Report* (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2004), 400. Hereafter cited as The 9/11 Commission Final Report.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 399.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 399.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 403.

<sup>5</sup> The White House, Institutionalize the War on Terror: Domestic Institutional Reform, 2006; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/waronterror/2006/sectionVII.html>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report Final Report*, 404. It was the intent of the 9-11 Commission to limit the operational authorities of NCTC. The NCTC “should not direct the actual execution of these operations, leaving the job to the agencies.” The director of NCTC was regulated to the right of concurring “in the choices of personnel to lead the operating entities of the departments and agencies focused on counterterrorism...” Additionally, the 9-11 Commission believed the head of NCTC should work with the director of the Office of Management and Budget in developing the president’s counterterrorism budget.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 2006), II-7. Hereafter cited as Joint Operation Planning.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 2001), ix. Hereafter cited as Unified Action Armed Forces.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Klitgaard and Paul C. Light, eds. *High Performance Government: Structure, Leadership, Incentives* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 29.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>13</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report Final Report*, 400.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 400.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 401.

<sup>16</sup> Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Widavsky, *Implementation* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 98.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>19</sup> *Unified Action Armed Forces*, III-1.

<sup>20</sup> James L. Stokesbury, "Leadership as an Art," in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 1.

<sup>21</sup> Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, eds., *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 75.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 2006), II-7. Hereafter cited as *Joint Operations*.

<sup>23</sup> *Unified Action Armed Forces*, III-1.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., I-3.

<sup>25</sup> James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac – The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), 17.

<sup>26</sup> *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79th Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., 1946 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 254. Hereafter cited as *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 252.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 238.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 241.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 240.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 252.

<sup>32</sup> Kori Schake and Bruce Berkowitz, "National Security: A Better Approach," *Hoover Digest* 4 (Fall 2005); [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/2913101.html>; Internet; accessed 08 December 2006.

<sup>33</sup> Locher III, 10.

<sup>34</sup> David F. Musto, *The American Disease: Origins of Narcotics Control* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 54.

<sup>35</sup> Schake and Berkowitz, 3.

<sup>36</sup> Larry M. Keeton, *Collegial Czar or Combatant Commander – Who Should Lead America's War on Drugs?*, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 06 April 1998), 23.

<sup>37</sup> U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, *National Drug Policy: A Review of the Status of the Drug War*, 104<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 March 1996, 1.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Keeton, 20.

<sup>40</sup> Gordon Witkin, "The Trouble Reign of the Nation's Drug Czar," 8 September 1997; available from [http://www.vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com/hww/results/results\\_single\\_ftPES.jhtml](http://www.vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com/hww/results/results_single_ftPES.jhtml); Internet; accessed 15 January 2007.

<sup>41</sup> Jay M. Shafritz, J. Steven Ott, and Yong Suk Jang., eds., *Classics of Organization Theory*, (Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadworth, 2005), 48.

<sup>42</sup> Henri Fayol, "General Principles of Management," in *Classics of Organization Theory*, ed. Jay M. Shafritz, J. Steven Ott, and Yong Suk Jang (Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadworth, 2005), 48.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 49.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 51.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 51.

<sup>47</sup> John R. Hook, *Leading At the Top* (New York: iUniverse, 2006), 12.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> The White house, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2006), 5.

<sup>52</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 96.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 75.

<sup>54</sup> *Joint Operations*, A-2.

<sup>55</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report Final Report*, 399.

<sup>56</sup> *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 264.